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JURISDICTION: 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. 
Did the Third District Court ("trial court") err in ordering that appellant's attempt to adopt 
the visitation schedule contained in UCA § 30-3-35 is a modification of a divorce decree when 
appellant's divorce decree provides that appellant is awarded reasonable visitation? The 
supporting authority for this issue is UCA § 30-3-32, 30-3-33, 30-3-34, and 30-3-35. 
STATUTES: 
The following are relevant portions of the Utah statutes which apply in this case, and the 
Utah Court of Appeals can take judicial notice of the remaining portions of the statutes which 
are attached as an addendum hereto: 
UCA § 30-3-32: 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote visitation at a level consistent with all parties' 
interests. 
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated potential 
harm to the child: 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents 
to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation 
or divorce; 
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for 
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best 
interests; and 
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in 
parenting the child. 
UCA § 30-3-33: 
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory guidelines are 
suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between parents. These advisory guidelines 
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include: 
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-
imposed solution; 
(2) the visitation schedule shall utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the 
child's life; 
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater frequency or other 
arrangements consistent with the child's best interests for children under age 5; otherwise 
the visitation schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 shall apply; 
UCA § 30-3-34: 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may establish a visitation 
schedule consistent with the best interest of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the visitation schedule as 
provided in Section 30-3-35 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child. The 
visitation schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent 
and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
UCA § 30-3-35: 
(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, beginning with 
kindergarten. 
(2) If the parents do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule shall be 
considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled: 
STATEMENT OF CASE: 
The nature of the case involves visitation of the parties' three minor children and the 
motion of the appellant seeking visitation with the children consistent with UCA § 30-3-35. 
Appellant sought, through an Order to Show Cause, visitation of the children, and a hearing was 
held on December 14, 1993, before Domestic Relations Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
Subsequent to his recommendation, the appellant filed and objection and sought a hearing from 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson. Judge Hanson denied the hearing request and issued a memorandum 
decision and order (see attached exhibit "A"). Judge Hanson ruled that appellant had improperly 
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sought to modify his decree of divorce by order to show cause which was inconsistent with Rule 
6-404 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT: 
The appellant has properly sought visitation pursuant to UCA § 30-3-35 as the decree of 
divorce states that the appellant is entitled to reasonable visitation. It was and is the intention 
of the Utah Legislature to provide a visitation schedule which is: i) in the best interest of the 
children, and ii) is at a minimum reasonable. Thus, the appellant holds that i) since there is a 
reasonable visitation schedule established by statute, ii) the appellant's decree of divorce states 
that he is entitled to reasonable visitation, and iii) the appellant and appellee could not agree to 
a visitation schedule, and iv) visitation should be in the best interest of the children, that both the 
appellant and the children are entitled to the visitation schedule as outlined in Section 30-3-35 
without first obtaining a modification of decree of divorce, as appellant is not modifying the 
decree of divorce. Appellant holds that he did not attempt to modify his decree of divorce, rather 
he sought reasonable visitation which has been outlined by statute. 
ARGUMENT: 
Pursuant to the decree of divorce in this matter, the appellant was awarded reasonable 
visitation with the parties three minor children. As were many cases historically, the courts in 
Utah have used the word reasonable with respect to visitation in divorce decrees. In many 
divorce decrees, as in this case, there was no schedule set forth in the decree itself, just the word 
reasonable in conjunction with the noncustodial parent's visitation rights. In other words, the 
parties or the courts were left to decide what is reasonable. Unfortunately, many parties could 
not agree to the reasonableness of visitation and thus sought court assistance. After many years 
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of parents clogging the courts with visitation disputes and in the best interest of the children of 
divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents, the Utah Legislature passed into law effective May 
3, 1993, a minimum visitation schedule1. The appellant has sought visitation pursuant to the 
minimum visitation schedule and was denied, as the trial court interpreted the attempt to adopt 
the minimum visitation schedule as a modification of the decree of divorce. This, however, is 
not the case. Despite any lack of consistency with the statute, had the parties' decree of divorce 
outlined specific days and time for visitation, the trial court's argument would be consistent 
because the minimum visitation schedule may if fact change certain agreed upon dates and times 
for visitation. However, the decree of divorce in this matter simply states that the appellant is 
awarded reasonable visitation. It is understood that the minimum visitation schedule is, at a 
minimum, in the best interest of the children and is reasonable. In fact Section 30-3-33 (7) 
states: 
"the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the visitation 
allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized 
visitation provided in Section 30-3-35. UCA § 30-3-33 (7) emphasis added. 
Although there is reference to divorced parents in Section 30-3-32 (2)(a), it would appear 
that the definition is somewhat inconsistent. At 30-3-32 (3)(a), for purposes of Sections 30-3-32 
through 30-3-37: "'Child' means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated 
parents." Yet at Section 30-3-32 (2)(a), it is in the best interest of the child of ... divorced ... 
parents... This implies that the child of divorced parents also should fall under the definition 
contained in 30-3-32 (3)(a). Appellant holds that this is an oversight on the legislature's part and 
should be corrected. In addition to this error, Section 30-3-32 (2)(a) leaves out that it is in the 
best interest of the child of separating parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing 
access, yet the section ends with the statement "following separation." This too is probably an 
oversight on the legislature's part. Since these inconsistencies exist, it is assumed that the 
definition of Child shall include the child or children of divorced parents, as implied at Section 
30-3-32. 
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Thus, it is implicit that the minimum visitation schedule is in fact reasonable. For the trial court 
to hold that the best interest of the children are best served by a schedule which is less than that 
provided for in Section 30-3-35 is to assume that the minimum visitation schedule is 
unreasonable. Further, the trial court held that by using the minimum visitation schedule 
contained in Section 30-3-35, it was a modification of the decree of divorce. However, the 
decree of divorce awards the appellant reasonable visitation and as the minimum visitation 
schedule is reasonable, the appellant is in fact not modifying the divorce decree. A modification 
implies changes to the original decree; however, the retroactive adoption of the minimum 
visitation schedule is not a modification in as much as the decree specifically awards the 
appellant reasonable visitation. 
The appellate court may be concerned about the custodial parent rights as well. 
Fortunately, the Utah legislature has provided for the rights of the custodial parent in the 
rebuttable presumption contained in UCA § 30-3-34. 
CONCLUSION: 
Appellant respectfully requests the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's order. 
Appellant properly sought visitation pursuant to UCA § 30-3-35 through an order to show cause, 
as Section 30-3-35 should be considered reasonable and retroactively adopted when no schedule 
is ordered in the original decree of divorce but the noncustodial parent is awarded reasonable 
visitation. 
DATED THIS 28th DAY OF June, 1994. 
ICHARB T. WYGANT 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Richard T. Wygant, served two (2) copies of the foregoing Appellant Brief upon Roger 
K. Tschanz, Esq., attorney for the appellee in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail 
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Roger K. Tschanz, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellee 
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'Richard T. Wygant 
WYGANT V. WYGANT PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
places pursuant to recently enacted legislation dealing with 
visitation rights of non-custodial parents. 
While it certainly may be appropriate, particularly in view of 
the history of this case, that visitation be precisely and 
accurately determined so that the parties will understand their 
respective obligations, an existing divorce Decree may not be 
modified by means of an Order to Show Cause procedure as the 
defendant has attempted to do here. Compounding the problem is the 
defendant's apparent failure to seek a formal Petition to Modify 
where a full, appropriate hearing can be had, even in the face of 
visitation difficulties that the parties have experienced over the 
years. 
Accordingly, the Commissioner's recommendation that visitation 
may not be modified on the basis of an Order to Show Cause 
proceeding, all as particularly specified in Rule 6-404 of the Code 
of Judicial Administration, is appropriate. This Court declines to 
grant an expedited hearing on a matter where the Commissioner is 
clearly not in error, and where the immediacy of the situation is 
because of the defendant's failure over the years to file a formal 
Petition to Modify so that the matter can be heard in a fashion 
that would give both sides an opportunity to present their 
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respective positions as to what formalized visitation dates and 
times ought to be imposed. 
The Court assumes that the defendant does not object to the 
Commissioner's recommendation that the defendant should be granted 
one-half of the children's Christmas visitation, and a portion of 
the day on Christmas Day. 
The Commissioner's recommendation is contained in the file on 
that issue, however, it has not been reduced to a formal Order, nor 
has the time period for the plaintiff to object expired as of the 
date of the dictation of this Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court declines to consider the 
defendant's request for expedited disposition of his Objection to 
the Commissioner's recommendation of December 13, 1993. 
Further, this Court affirms the Commissioner's observation and 
recommendation that the visitation originally provided for in the 
Decree of Divorce may not be modified through an Order to Show 
Cause procedure, all as clearly set forth in Rule 6-404(1) of the 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
No formal Order will be necessary in connection with the 
defendant's request for expedited hearing or this Court's 
affirmation of the Commissioner's refusal to consider modification 
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based upon the Order to Show Cause process inasmuch as this Order 
will stand as the Court's orders on those issues. 
Dated this / y^dav of December, 1993. 
/^L 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
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30-3-32. Visitation — Intent — Policy — Definition. 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote visitation at a level consis-
tent with all parties' interests. 
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or sub-
stantiated potential harm to the child: 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or 
adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access 
to each parent following separation or divorce; 
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and 
responsible for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child 
consistent with the child's best interests; and 
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively 
involved in parenting the child. 
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: 
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or 
adjudicated parents. 
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on 
the evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas school break 
until the evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas 
Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. 
(c) "Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a 
weekend, holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), reli-
gious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and 
"Christmas school vacation." 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-32, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 be-
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory 
guidelines are suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between par-
ents. These advisory guidelines include: 
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are pref-
erable to a court-imposed solution; 
(2) the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity 
and stability of the child's life; 
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater 
frequency or other arrangements consistent with the child's best interests 
for children under age 5; otherwise the visitation schedule as provided in 
Section 30-3-35 shall apply; 
(4) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the 
child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, 
family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other sig-
nificant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which 
may inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule; 
(5) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times speci-
fied and return the child at the times specified, and the child's regular 
school hours shall not be interrupted; 
(6) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation at the 
time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or 
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the 
time he is returned; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase 
the visitation allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish 
the standardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35; 
(8) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of 
exercising visitation; 
(9) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to either 
parent's failure to comply with a court-ordered visitation schedule; 
(10) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and com-
munity functions in which the child is participating or being honored, and 
the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully; 
(11) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school 
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and 
shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a 
medical emergency; 
(12) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and 
telephone number within 24 hours of any change; 
(13) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact 
during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child; 
(14) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in 
allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child 
care; 
(15) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the 
name, current address, and telephone number of the other parent and 
shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, 
and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for 
good cause orders otherwise; and 
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious 
holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a reli-
gious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right 
to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-33, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, eh. 131, § 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 be-
30-3-34, Best interests — Rebuttable presumption. 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may 
establish a visitation schedule consistent with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the visita-
tion schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 shall be presumed to be in the 
best interests of the child. The visitation schedule shall be considered the 
minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The presumption may be rebutted based upon a finding of the court 
including any of the following criteria: 
(a) visitation would endanger the child's physical health; 
(b) visitation would significantly impair the child's emotional develop-
ment; 
(c) a substantiated allegation of child abuse exists; 
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills; 
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide ade-
quate food and shelter for the child during periods of visitation; 
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of 
sufficient maturity; 
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure 
youth corrections facility, or an adult corrections facility; and 
(h) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best inter-
ests of the child. 
(3) Once the visitation schedule has been established, the parties may not 
alter the schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-34, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 4. Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 25 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch 131 be-
(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, 
beginning with kindergarten. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following sched-
ule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial 
parent and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or 
the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m; 
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the 
entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continu-
ing each year; 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes 
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncusto-
dial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for 
that school day; 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the 
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free 
from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent 
shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is enti-
tled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 
until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is enti-
tled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) New Year's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holidav 
(iv) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(v) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. 
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vii) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(viii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(ix) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined 
in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. 
until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally di-
vided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(ij Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school 
for purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial par-
ent's extended visitation shall be lh of the vacation time for year-round 
school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 131, § 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 131 be-
